

X.—Simonides on Ἀρετή

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The scene of Plato's *Protagoras* is, for the most part, the house of the wealthy Callias, the son of Hipponicus, at Athens. He was one of the wealthiest Athenians of his time, and his house, we may imagine, was as spacious as it was elegant.¹ But on this occasion even his resources were strained to the uttermost to accommodate the swarm of sophists who, attracted by the sweetness of his patronage, had hived in his house. Each of them was, no doubt, accompanied by his own coterie, and the numbers of the foreigners were swelled by members of the rich and fashionable youth of Athens, like the young and brilliant Alcibiades, the poet Agathon, Xanthippus and Paralus, the sons of Pericles and half-brothers of their host, as well as Charmides, Critias, and many others. They had probably taken possession of the whole house and were certainly occupying its central court, together with the porticos and rooms that opened upon it.

In one of the porticos — presumably that nearest the street — Protagoras of Abdera, who had lately come to town in the course of a lecture-tour, was pacing up and down, engaged in the exposition of some subject; by his enchanting discourse he drew after him, as Socrates noted, a retinue of apprentices, pupils, and admirers from home and abroad. In the opposite portico Hippias of Elis sat enthroned, explaining to the ranks of his hearers, who were ranged about him seated upon benches, some abstruse questions concerning the true nature of the things that move in the heavens. So great had been the number of guests that Callias had been obliged to clear out one of his store-rooms, which gave on the court, and to convert it into a bed-room. Here was installed Prodicus of Ceos, who was still in bed. Very likely he was, or thought himself, an invalid; in any case his condition did not hinder the practice or the advertise-

¹ For the wealth of Callias, cf. 337D; the description of his house begins at 314C. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor J. W. Graham, for help in describing the design of the house. It is often said that Athenian private houses were invariably modest at this period; but, as Professor Graham points out, this view is not supported by the results of the excavations at Olynthus.

ment of his profession, for he was holding a levee at his bed-side, and his deep voice gained in strength, if not in clarity, from its reverberations within the narrow walls. The house was in fact full to bursting with learning and wit, so that Hippias, looking upon the scene a little later, was moved to declare that Athens was "the town-hall of the city of Greek wisdom."² The servants, to be sure, thinking of the work to be done, did not survey the company with such complacency, and the door-keeper, who took Socrates and Hippocrates for still more sophists, replied brusquely that the master was engaged, and slammed the door with all his strength in their faces. At last they were admitted grudgingly, and only after assuring him that they were not sophists in search of a lodging but were calling upon Protagoras, his master's chief guest.

The droll irony of this description, which Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates, is delicious, and is full of that comic power which delighted Macaulay once, as he bent helpless with laughter over his old Ficino, on the voyage to India. The words with which Socrates describes Prodicus might be appropriately used of any of the sophists present: he seemed divinely inspired to speak with every kind of wisdom.³ That touch is splendid, but it ought not to prevent us from recognising that Callias was entertaining on that memorable morning as brilliant a company as even that inveterate patron of the new learning had ever received under his roof.

It was before such an assembly that Protagoras undertook (316c), with a gracious and superb confidence, first the profession and then the defence of his calling. He could speak with an authority that came from his position as well as his years, and it was a golden opportunity to attract pupils and to score off his rivals at the same time. The knowledge that he gives his pupils is in reality ancient, having been possessed by poets and sages for generations, but he is, he says, the first to profess it publicly and to call himself a sophist, that is, a practitioner of wisdom. What he teaches is not the dull stuff of the special sciences; it is the very thing all ambitious young men desire most to attain, the excellence by virtue of which a man is a good citizen. He then proceeds, urged on by Socrates' questions, to give a display, by the use of fable and argument, of his powers and opinions. Socrates is mightily impressed, but sees a

² 337D: τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας.

³ 315E: πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος. The word θεῖος is used, with similar irony, of Simonides in *Rep.* 1.331E; the measure of the irony may be gauged by contrasting the proper and heroic sense of the word: e.g. in Pind. *Pyth.* 6.38.

slight difficulty, which Protagoras will, no doubt, quickly remove (328E). And so, in the familiar way the Socratic examination begins, and continues on its rigorous course until Protagoras, chafing over this irrelevant hair-splitting and foreseeing that in dialectic of this kind at least he is likely to have the worse of it, refuses to continue with short answers and breaks into a long exposition. Socrates, who is interested only in the examination of opinions and not at all in the display of rhetoric, is reminded of an engagement elsewhere, and the argument is on the point of being abandoned. The occasion is saved and the quarrel composed only by the intervention of Callias, Alcibiades, Prodicus, and Hippias. It is agreed, although with reluctance on Protagoras' part, that the disputation shall proceed in the dialectical fashion as before, but that Protagoras shall be given the opportunity to ask questions for a time and Socrates shall answer (338C-E).

Protagoras' position is now much weakened in the eyes of the discerning and not least in his own. Since he has consented to argue in Socrates' way, he knows that he cannot again escape those relentless questions but must continue to the end, which he divines is likely to be bitter enough. In this crisis, when he has everything at stake, he falls back on a method of argument that was, no doubt, familiar to everyone, the interpretation, or rather the refutation of the poets.

Texts from the poets passed, in the Greece of the time, as the common coin of ethical wisdom. They summed up, in memorable language, an insight that was more ancient, more authoritative, and more penetrating than any judgment made *ad hoc* was likely to be. Professor Werner Jaeger has told how the sophists, and Socrates too, attacked the validity of the poets' teachings, and sought to substitute for them a new learning founded on reason, variously conceived.⁴ A favourite method was to argue that a poet could be convicted of contradicting himself: as if a rational moralist were today to criticise popular wisdom by pointing out, for example, the inconsistency between "Do it now" and "Don't cross your bridges before you come to them." Socrates in the *Meno* brings such a charge, not altogether fairly, against Theognis, and his treatment of the poet there is, no doubt, not unusual.⁵

⁴ W. Jaeger, *Paideia* 1 (2nd Eng. ed.; New York 1945) 296.

⁵ *Meno* 95c-96A. See my discussion of Socrates' criticism in *Phoenix* 5 (1951) 9-10.

The poets might have been defended by the argument that their pronouncements were to be judged in their own contexts and not as abstract, universal principles. It might have been pointed out that "Do it now" applies not to all actions, but only to those which, according to judgment, ought to be performed now; and that "Don't cross your bridges" refers to a useless concern for an eventuality that is, though possible, not within the range of practicable action. Even Theognis may be defended on the ground that he denies the possibility of teaching excellence only in cases where a good natural endowment is lacking but affirms it where this exists.

To undertake a defence on these lines, however, is to resort to a concrete, perhaps even historical, interpretation. It is to take for granted that the words are true and to concern oneself only with putting them in the setting of their particular filiations. But this is the very thing that the sophists could not do, for the truth of the texts was what they were questioning. Accordingly their procedure is the opposite: they begin with the meaning of the words and argue that it is self-contradictory or inconsistent with something else that is known to be true. Poetry is to be measured not by its own yardstick, but by the measure of truth, rationally and abstractly conceived.

We know then what to expect when Protagoras makes his final move, saying (339A) that he will continue the discussion of human excellence by questioning Socrates about the poem written by Simonides for Scopas, the son of Creon, a Thessalian princeling.

The poem was well known to Socrates, who assured Protagoras that he need not quote it all, and presumably to most of the company as well. In fact, it had to be well known if it were to serve Protagoras' purpose: it would do little to revive his fainting prestige if he were merely to show that Socrates was ignorant of an obscure poem to which Greek opinion had never appealed for practical guidance. He had to demonstrate that he was better qualified than either the old and revered Simonides or the artless but troublesome Socrates to teach the art of good citizenship.

The poem is quoted at length only here in all the literature that is preserved from antiquity; and Wilamowitz, whose study is the foundation of all later criticism,⁶ has given reasons for supposing

⁶ U.v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Das Skolion des Simonides an Skopas," first published in *NGG* (1898), and reprinted with revisions in *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913) 159-91; my references are to the later version. Since Wilamowitz, the chief

that partial quotations in later authors are, in fact, made from Plato's account and not from Simonides' own book.⁷ The poem is here preserved because it was well known in the fifth century, but not wholly preserved because it was too well known to quote in full.

Protagoras begins by giving the first lines of the opening stanza:

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθῶς γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ
τετράγωνον,⁸ ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

He then induces Socrates to agree that the poem is well made and that it cannot be well made if it is self-contradictory. Next he goes on, as he says, a little further in the poem (in fact to the beginning of the next stanza) and quotes three more lines:

οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελῶς τὸ Πιττάκειον
νέμεται,⁹ καίτοι¹⁰ σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰ-
ρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

discussions are these: H. Jurenka, "Des Simonides Siegeslied auf Skopas in Platons Protagoras," *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien* (1906) 865-75; K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn 1916) 130-32; J. T. Sheppard, *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles* (Cambridge 1920) xxx-xxxii; H. D. Verdam, "De carmine Simonideo, quod interpretatur Plato in Protagora dialogo," *Mnemosyne* N.S. 56 (1928) 299-310; C. M. Bowra, "Simonides and Scopas," *CP* 29 (1934) 230-39; also *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford 1936) 340-51 (to which my references are made); G. Christ, *Simonidesstudien* (Freiburg 1941) 13-26; H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (New York 1951) 396-403; H. Gundert, "Die Simonides-Interpretation in Platons Protagoras," *EPMHNEIA: Festschrift Otto Regenbogen* (Heidelberg 1952) 71-93. In addition, there are discussions in H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets* (London 1904) 309-17; and in the editions of the *Protagoras* by J. Adam (Cambridge 1893), W. Nestle (7th ed.; Leipzig and Berlin 1931), and G. Calogero (Florence 1937). These works, when referred to hereafter, will be designated by the name of the author alone.

⁷ Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 159, note 2.

⁸ The word *τετράγωνος* is used of the man of perfect *ἀρετή*, as Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.11.1411b27) observed, no doubt remembering the quotation of Simonides' poem by Plato; cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 1.10.1100b21. The usage is very likely Pythagorean in origin, for the Pythagoreans reduced virtue, like all other things, to numbers and geometric figures and, in particular, justice was four: cf. Nestle's note *ad* 339b11. If so, the word had very probably a connotation of strict rationalism and austerity that was not to Simonides' taste. His own cast of mind was more empirical: cf. note 75 below.

⁹ The construction here is much debated. The old view, set forth by Heindorf, connected *ἐμμελῶς* with *εἰρημένον* and translated, e.g. "Nor do I think that the saying of Pittacus was said harmoniously, although said by a wise man": so Bowra (above, note 6) 343. But this is not acceptable for a number of reasons: (1) *νέμεται* appears never to mean "think"; (2) the connection of *ἐμμελῶς* with *εἰρημένον* is harsh; (3) the use of *καίτοι* with the participle appears sound: cf. the following note. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 166, dissatisfied with the old opinion, proposed to translate: "verkehrt-

How, he asks triumphantly, can the two passages be reconciled? In the one Simonides himself expresses an opinion which in the other he censures Pittacus for holding: he cannot be right in both. The spectators, who had been shrewdly observing the delivery of this counter-blow, broke into a thunder of approval, and Socrates, at whom the blow was aimed, felt, or said he felt, his eyes dim and his head reel, so that he had to play for time before replying.

It is clear that Protagoras has performed a real *tour de force* in discovering an unsuspected contradiction in a poem that was well known to all in that distinguished company. This point is important in two respects. First, it precludes our believing (as the received interpretation of the poem would have us believe¹¹) that

erweise wird von mir das Wort des Pittakos anerkannt." However, the meaning given to *vêuerai* is improbable and the tense causes difficulty; and on these grounds Wilamowitz' interpretation was rightly criticised by H. Fränkel in *NGG philol.-hist. kl.* (1924) 99, note 3 and by Verdam (above, note 6) 307. In any case Wilamowitz was, no doubt, led to give this translation by his view that Simonides began with his own opinion, which he now corrects; but this can hardly be right: cf. the next paragraph in the text and 155 below. On the other hand, Wilamowitz was justified in comparing the use of *voûlêrai*. The words *vêuw*, *vômos*, *voûlêw* form a group that would repay further study. Meanwhile, cf. the useful discussions by F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945) 73–78 and by E. Laroche, *Histoire de la racine NEM- en grec ancien* (Paris 1949) 30–31. Heinimann points out rightly that the meaning of *voûlêw* in the earliest occurrences regularly reflects its derivation from *vômos*. It means "to observe a custom," e.g. what custom recognises as right (*τὰ δίκαια* in Theogn. 279; of a customary language, Hdt. 1.142.3). The passive predominates in the early instances: cf. Alcaeus fr. 44 (Diehl²); Xenoph. B2.13, Heracl. B14, Parm. B6.8 (Diels⁶). The meaning "to think" is a special and later development that becomes common first in Herodotus. Something like the primitive meaning of *voûlêw* is to be found also in Simonides' *vêuerai*, and it is convenient to translate "is current" (Heinimann 74, note 44 and Fränkel [above, note 6] 399 give "gilt"; Laroche 30 gives "on donne cours"). The use of an adverb to denote a bad observance (*κακῶς* in Theogn.) or a bad custom (*εἰκῆ* in Xenoph.) is easy, and one is tempted to render freely: "the maxim of Pittacus, although current coin, does not ring true in my ear." This seems to come close to the mark, although it remains to be explained how *vêuerai* came to have a meaning similar to that of its congener *voûlêrai*; but cf. Laroche. Wilamowitz compares the interesting passage in Thuc. 1.6.2, but that is itself in need of interpretation.

¹⁰ G. M. Bolling argued in *AJP* 23 (1902) 319–21 that the use of *kaitrou* (in the sense of *καίτερος*) with the participle is wholly post-classical. But he is obliged to assume an ellipse of the copula here, and to accept conjectures in Aristoph. *Ecl.* 159 and Lysias 31.34; Hdt. 8.53.1 is inconclusive. It seems better to regard the construction as authentic, though rare: cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1934) 559; E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* 2 (vervollständigt und herausgegeben v. A. Debrunner; Munich 1940) 389.

¹¹ Cf. Wilamowitz 165–67, Bowra 341, Fränkel 397–98 (all above, note 6). In an earlier study, published in *NGG philol.-hist. kl.* (1924) 99–100, Fränkel argued that the repetition of Pittacus' saying by Simonides, as if he had forgotten the first mention of it, is characteristic of archaic art. It must be granted that a cyclical movement is some-

Simonides began, not with his own opinion, but with his text from the wise Pittacus. Had Socrates and the other spectators, who knew the poem well and were men of taste and learning, understood it in this way, they could never have approved Protagoras' statement that Simonides began with his own opinion.¹² It would have been a transparent trick.¹³ Secondly, if there is a contradiction in the poem, it cannot have been plain to the common opinion. Somehow Socrates and the rest must have understood the poem in a way that admitted no contradiction between the opinion with which Simonides begins and the censure of Pittacus with which he continues.

Socrates was, no doubt, less staggered by all this than he pretended. Still, he needed time in which to consider again the poet's meaning, and in order to gain it (as he is to confess later to his friend) he calls on Prodicus to help in the defence of Simonides, his fellow-Cean. His manner is ironical and mock-heroic, as he uses the words with which in the *Iliad* the Scamander called upon the Simois to aid in staying the onset of Achilles upon Troy;¹⁴ but as often his irony conceals something true and valuable.

He begins (340B) by pointing out that there can be no contradiction if there is a difference between Simonides' *γενέσθαι* and Pittacus' *ἔμμεναι*: Prodicus assures him that the distinction exists. Perhaps Prodicus, and many others too, would affirm (he goes on) that it is difficult to become good. They might quote the saying of Hesiod, that the gods set sweat before excellence; but when a man once attains to its peak, then it is easy to possess, although before it was hard.

Protagoras assumes that Socrates is attributing to Simonides the opinion that it is easy to be good. The assumption is natural in the circumstances, but dangerous in dealing with Socrates' banter. In fact, Socrates had not made the attribution, although

times found in poems of the period; but this would be something different — the quotation, identification, and rejection of a famous maxim only a few lines after it had been quoted in full.

¹² In fact, Socrates states later (340B and 343D-344B) that Simonides gives his own opinion in the opening lines. On this point the antagonists are in agreement.

¹³ It is true that Protagoras is represented as giving an *ἐπίδειξις*, not an argument, and that the aim is to show cleverness rather than to carry conviction. Witness Hippias' approval (347A-B) of Socrates' outrageous, but brilliant, exposition! Nevertheless, a manoeuvre of the kind attributed to Protagoras by the critics would be neither convincing nor clever.

¹⁴ Hom. *Il.* 21.308-10.

he observed innocently that Prodicus, who was more concerned with distinguishing between words than with finding the truth, might wish to subscribe to this opinion. All unmindful of this, Protagoras objects, in a downright and matter-of-fact way, that it would be a mark of ignorance in the wise Simonides to make so light of the possession of excellence, which all men are agreed to call the most difficult of all things.

The contrast between the subtle hair-splitting of Prodicus and the blunt common-sense of Protagoras is too amusing to abandon at once, and Socrates goes on. The divine wisdom of Prodicus is old, older than that of Simonides, and even older (the inference is easy) than the ancient knowledge of which Protagoras claimed to be the heir. His skill is with words, and in particular their proper connotations: as if one were to point out that the connotations of "terrible" are generally bad and that it is therefore incorrect to use the word in a different way, as in "terribly clever." Prodicus will know about the finicky usages of Simonides and the Cean, and he ought to be consulted about the connotations of *χαλεπὸν* in Simonides' poem. What does it mean?

Prodicus is now in a peculiar position. On the one hand he has been brought into the lime-light that beats upon the two principal actors and Socrates has shown a surprising respect for his study of synonyms. It must have been rather exhilarating to have it suggested that Protagoras would have interpreted the poem better if he had, like Socrates, become a pupil of Prodicus. This was turning the tables on Protagoras with a vengeance. On the other hand Socrates praised his divine wisdom, it must have seemed, just a little more than one liked, and it was tiresome of him to keep up that old joke about the strictness of Cean in language as in morals. All in all, he felt a little uneasy about Socrates who, for all his urbanity and deference, did put one in awkward situations. The worst of it was, one couldn't with a good grace do anything but fall in with Socrates' whims. The analogy between *δεινός* and *χαλεπός* was too close for comfort. If one insists that words be allowed only one unambiguous connotation, then it must be granted that *χαλεπός*, when used rightly, can connote only what is bad. His triumph, he felt, had a surprising sting in it. The only thing was to humour Socrates: he replies that *χαλεπός* in Cean means "bad."¹⁵ Entering

¹⁵ No one is likely to miss humour as broad as this. The danger is that one will overlook what is serious in it. I have here looked at the scene from Prodicus' point of

now fully into the game, he asserts that Simonides was finding fault with Pittacus for misusing the word in saying that it is *χαλεπὸν* to be good. After all Pittacus, being a Lesbian, was nurtured in an outlandish dialect and had no skill at the proper differentiation of words!

Protagoras is quite unshaken by this fancy and replies stolidly that Simonides meant by *χαλεπὸν* exactly what everyone means by it, that which is not easy but achieved through great pains. Socrates at once drops his pretence and suggests sweetly that all this was simply Prodicus' joke:¹⁶ he was testing Protagoras to see whether he would be able to defend his thesis. Clearly Simonides did not give this sense to *χαλεπὸν*, since he went on to attribute to God alone the capacity of being good,

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχει γέρας.

But to attribute to God something that he had just said was bad would have been wicked of Simonides and quite un-Cean!¹⁷ Prodicus must have preferred to ignore Socrates' desertion and his ironic tone. At any rate, preserving his dignity as best he may, he joins Hippias in urging Socrates to make his own interpretation of the poem.

This pleasant excursion completed, Socrates now turns (342A) to the task that he has undertaken. He has learned from observing Protagoras that a sophist should lay claim to a wisdom that is ancient, hitherto recondite, and only now fully made known. And so he expounds the astonishing view that the secret of Spartan and Cretan strength lies not in courage and military skill, but in the secret practice of philosophy. To be sure, the Laconisers in the Greek cities, who ape the Spartans, seize upon their physical training to imitate. But this is a mere mistake, fostered by the wise

view, in order to bring out (what Plato could take for granted) that there is something, if not much, in Prodicus' ridiculous answer. A. E. Taylor in his *Plato: The Man and his Work* (New York 1929) 254, note 1 compares Pindar's *τερπνῶν . . . χαλεπῶν τε κρίσις* (fr.116.4 Bowra) and Homer's *χαλεπὸν . . . γῆρας* (*Il.* 8.103). He might have added *χαλεπὴ ὥρα* in Socrates' speech at *Prot.* 344D. Plato makes merciless fun of Prodicus' *διαίρεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων* but Prodicus, although made to appear ridiculous, is not simply a buffoon. Adam, in his note *ad* 341D, gives a different — and more flattering — explanation of Prodicus' action.

¹⁶ The joke is on Prodicus: cf. the same gambit in *Apol.* 24C.

¹⁷ Here (341E) and a little later (343E and 345D) Socrates shows his mastery of a method of interpretation that had been used by Protagoras (340E) and is not unknown today. It consists in dismissing a rival interpretation as unworthy of the author in question.

Spartans themselves, who practise their philosophy in secret. When indeed they can bear the secrecy no longer and feel that they must indulge in a public outburst of philosophy, they organise one of their famous deportations of foreigners so that they can meet and display their wisdom unobserved. For a like reason they prevent their young men from leaving Sparta, so that they may not forget abroad the profound teachings they have absorbed at home. As a proof of his theory Socrates points to the celebrated Spartan brevity and weightiness of speech. An undistinguished Spartan may seem rather dull at conversation until at some point he drives home, like a spear, some brief, compressed, and memorable saying that leaves one feeling stunned and helpless. The harvest of the Spartan culture is to be found also in the maxims of the Seven Wise Men, and in particular in those familiar sayings which they offered jointly to Apollo as the first fruits of their wisdom and inscribed upon his temple at Delphi: "Know yourself" and "Nothing in excess." A Spartan terseness, then, was the fashion of ancient philosophy and is exemplified in our dictum of Pittacus, who himself made one of the Seven. That dictum enjoyed indeed a certain vogue among the sages, and Simonides, who was ambitious of a reputation for wisdom, conceived his poem as an attack upon it, recognising that if he could defeat Pittacus, the reigning champion, he might enjoy the honour and the glory in his stead. The criticism of Pittacus is what gives unity to the poem.

Socrates now goes on to give a running interpretation of the poem, at first in some detail, later in a more general way. He quotes the text in snatches, not always with perfect accuracy, and occasionally in paraphrase; but it seems plain that he is moving steadily from the beginning to the end, and critics have been in general agreement, at least since Wilamowitz' study, in the reconstruction of the outline, although not the details, of the poem.¹⁸ A convenient version, to which references will hereafter be made, is that of E. Diehl in the first edition of the *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*.

After a consideration of the circumstances in which Socrates offered his interpretation no one is likely to suppose that what he says is to be taken *au pied de la lettre*; although some scholars of the

¹⁸ There is a useful summary of scholarly opinions before Wilamowitz in Appendix 1 of Adam's edition of the *Protagoras*. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 163, 182-83 has some salutary remarks about the uncertainties of the text, especially in regard to its metrical structure and dialectal forms.

last century went nearly so far.¹⁹ Moreover, Socrates concludes his light-hearted exposition by expressing his dissatisfaction with all interpretation of the poets (347C–348A). We are obliged to rely, he points out, not on ourselves, but on an external resource about which we can only disagree because there is no means of testing it by questioning. The proper method of discourse is one that tests, by disputation, both ourselves and the truth. It must be obvious after this that Socrates' interpretation cannot, to his mind, attain the truth nor indeed lead to any certain judgment. Nevertheless it would be wrong to fall into the opposite error of thinking that it is all simply illusion and sleight-of-hand. Socrates' irony, like Socrates himself, is not so absurd as it seems, absurd as it is.²⁰

Socrates sees from the first that Protagoras' *tour de force* will be exploded if it can be shown that there is a distinction between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*. But he does not stop after pointing out the distinction: Simonides does more than reject, in passing, the saying of Pittacus; he has made his whole poem an answer to it (343C and 344B). This astonishing thesis is then supported by a series of interpretations that might be called audacious and perverse, if they were not also brilliant and satirical. The *μὲν* of the opening line is intended, happily enough, to emphasise the difference between *γενέσθαι* and the *ἔμμεναι* of Pittacus' maxim which, Socrates imagines very conveniently, was present from the beginning to the poet's mind.²¹ It turns out too that *ἀλαθῶς*, in spite of all appearances, modifies *χαλεπὸν* in the next line. By the help of this violent *hyperbaton* he is enabled to argue that, in Simonides' opinion, to become good is alone truly difficult, but possible for a time.²² Pittacus is therefore wrong, for to be (and therefore to remain) good is, for a man, neither easy nor difficult but impossible; only a god could possess such a prerogative.

¹⁹ Cf. e.g. the general acceptance, before Wilamowitz, of Socrates' distinction between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*: cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 165.

²⁰ The phrase is A. E. Taylor's: cf. note 15 above. For the contrast between the real and the apparent Socrates, cf. Alcibiades in *Symp.* 221D–222A.

²¹ This appears to be the meaning of *ὑπειπόντα* (343E): cf. Adam's notes *ad* 343E16 and 344A21. The use of *μὲν* that Socrates has in mind is that in which *οὐ* . . . *ἀλλὰ* precedes. He makes this clear in the words *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν κτλ.* (344A). For the construction, cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1934) 378. At 344B Socrates recasts the antithesis in the commoner prose form (*ὥς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον*).

²² Earlier (at 340B) Socrates did not feel the need of this *hyperbaton*. There, however, he was only distinguishing between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*; here the proper use of *χαλεπὸν* is in question.

It would be absurd to speak of a difficulty in so playful an interpretation if it were not that Socrates proceeds next to remove one without having first said what it is. The difficulty is that in the following lines of the second stanza Simonides states that men *are* good or bad according to circumstances. A man who is overwhelmed by a desperate misfortune cannot help being bad, and everyone who enjoys success is good. Being (whether good or bad) is not only possible for men but inescapable: not even the gods fight against necessity.²³

This is a stern test, but Socrates, nothing daunted, rises to new subtleties (344c). The man who is overwhelmed by a desperate disaster has gone through a change from right to wrong action. That is, he has suffered a loss of knowledge, which is the only form of disaster. All human success is also the result of change, for if circumstance makes a man good, it is implied that he was before bad. If we say of men that they have been made good or bad through the power of circumstance, it is because they have become so.

Socrates could not quote the next lines, with their awkward *ἔμμεναι*, in support of his interpretation. The following sentence, however, is more accommodating, for it leaves the critical verb to be understood — or, in this case, misunderstood.

πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς . . .

Another verse, which Socrates cites from an unknown poet, is even better:

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.

And so the thesis is sustained, and Simonides is shown to have meant, even if he did not quite say, that all human success and failure is becoming, not being. Men cannot be lastingly good, although the best for the longest time are those whom the gods love.²⁴

The first six lines of the third stanza are taken as a reply to Pittacus in which the ideal of the blameless man is rejected as an impossible hope. To be sure, the words *τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν* show

²³ Cf. Pind. fr. 107.9 (Bowra): *σὺν δ' ἀνάγκῃ πᾶν καλόν*. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 176, note 2 compares also *Nem.* 9.27.

²⁴ This appears to be Socrates' interpretation of Simonides' *ἐπὶ πλεῖστον*: cf. 344b. in addition to the context of 345c.

that the impossibility is in becoming, not being, but these, like the *ἔμμεναι* of the preceding stanza, are conveniently ignored by Socrates and not observed by the others. The next line, because of its irony, is especially emphasised as a pointed reply to Pittacus:

ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω.

The following lines require more ingenuity. They might appear to say, he implies, that one may do ill willingly. But all the wise are agreed, he continues blandly (345D), that no one errs willingly, and it would be folly to attribute the opposite opinion to the wise Simonides. This peril may be escaped by construing *ἐκὼν* with the preceding, instead of the following, words. Simonides (whose fondness for money was well known) may very well have reflected, with some embarrassment, that the praise he gave in his poems to tyrants and the like was not given freely and willingly, but under the compulsion of profit. This being the case, his praise of someone conspicuously less than perfect might be received with a knowing smile instead of a seemingly deference. With this in mind, therefore, he assures Pittacus — and the Aeolic form *ἐπαίνημι* reminds us that this is intended for him — that on this occasion his praise is unconstrained and to be taken seriously.

Socrates coolly assumes that his paradox is self-evident, no doubt to the surprise of most of his hearers. No less arbitrary is the construction he puts upon these verses in order to elicit it. Moreover it might be objected that even this hard-won interpretation does not save Simonides from ignorance of what is known to all the wise: for Simonides is said to praise tyrants not from ignorance, but under the compulsion of avarice. Here is still a necessity in wrongful action: it is merely transferred from men in general to Simonides himself. But Socrates is blithely indifferent to all such difficulties. His point is that in these lines Simonides attempts, not without self-consciousness, to justify his judgment in the eyes of Pittacus. The rest is only a means to persuade others of this; and the sophists have shown that one need not, in these matters, be fastidious in the choice of means.

The interpretation of the last stanza has the same object and employs means that seem less reckless only because they are less patent. According to Socrates, Simonides refuses to be captious or find fault with everyone who falls short of perfection. Nor, he might have added, will he approve complaisantly anyone who is

undeserving of any praise. Instead he keeps to the mean:²⁵ he exempts from blame the honourable man of moderate achievements, but reserves his censure for the countless hosts of fools and knaves. The maxim with which the stanza concludes refers only to the former, and the *ἡλίθιοι* are the blameworthy. All this is addressed (and applied) to Pittacus (346E–347A). “Even if your saying, Pittacus, had been moderately worthy and true, I should not have found fault with you; but as it is, I must censure you, for you pretend to speak the truth, but really pronounce an opinion that is grossly false in a matter of the greatest moment.”

There is nothing of this last, it is obvious, in the poem, and there is, at the least, no explicit mention of the mean. Instead it appears that Simonides intended something quite different. The use of the first person singular half a dozen times in the last two stanzas betrays an unmistakable emphasis on the poet’s own judgment, and suggests a comparison with the false opinions of others. These are not far to seek: they are to be identified with the countless *ἡλίθιοι*,²⁶ for this word (and others like it²⁷) refers regularly to men of wrong opinions, and not to the culpable. Simonides means: “It is not right to find fault with a man simply for falling short of perfect *ἀρετή*, and I

²⁵ Socrates bolsters his interpretation by inserting in line 27 the words *οὐκ εἰμι φιλόμωμος*, which are thought to be taken from the lost lines at the beginning of the last stanza (notice that in his paraphrase at 346c he uses the more familiar Attic *φιλόσογος*). This alteration helps him find in the preceding lines a reference to the avoidance of one of two extremes. Indeed, he probably went further: for the MSS give the preceding sentence as *οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι*, a version that is similarly more accommodating to his interpretation, since it makes the sense general instead of particular. The interpretation of the poets by altering their texts might be ventured then in dispute, as now for scholarship’s sake. There is a notorious alteration of Pindar’s text in *Gorg.* 483E–484c, and a similar misinterpretation by Hippias in *Prot.* 337d. For a brief account, cf. W. C. Greene, *Moirai* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944) appendix 36. Hence it might be well for the editors of Plato, though not for those of Simonides, to print *οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι*.

²⁶ Most critics follow Socrates in finding in lines 27–28 a reference to the culpable, and so assent, at least by implication, to Socrates’ idea of a mean in censure. But the mean, so far as it exists, concerns circumstances only: cf. 163 below. By contrast, lines 26–29 deal with the poet’s pronouncement on merit in the two contrasted ideals: cf. 163 below. Set in this context, lines 27–28 would, in Socrates’ interpretation, be intolerably incoherent. The *ἡλίθιων ἀπειρῶν γενέθλα* are the countless others whose opinions the writer confidently rejects: cf. Hecat. fr. 1a (Jacoby): *οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν*. See also Herodotus’ ridicule of his numerous predecessors: 4.36.2. In Heraclitus the derision of the many is customary: B1, 2, 17, 29 etc. (Diels⁸).

²⁷ Cf. e.g. the use of *μῶρος* by Simonides himself in fr. 48.6 (Diehl); also *μάταιος* and *κενέφρων*.

shall not censure anyone for that, whatever fools may do — and there are plenty of them.” His purpose is simply to exculpate such a man, provided that he is honourable; not to balance this exculpation with censure of the truly culpable, as Socrates would have it. He is not concerned with the proper use of censure, but only with a particular, although common, case of its abuse. The introduction by Socrates of the doctrine of the mean in this form is a convenient fiction, designed to elicit from these lines a justification of proper censure in general, and of Simonides’ censure of Pittacus in particular.

Socrates has now finished his performance, and we hardly need the assurance he proceeds to give us that he attaches little importance to this kind of enquiry, since it does not aim seriously at finding the truth. Its purpose is in fact quite different. It was introduced by Protagoras as an alternative method of carrying on the argument, but the poem is truly relevant only in a general way and Protagoras’ criticism of it is not relevant at all. It must be clear that he regards discourse merely as a kind of competition in which he will employ any suitable means to vanquish his rivals: in this case he hopes not only to triumph over Socrates but to overthrow Simonides as well. The upshot is that Socrates is put in the strange position of exposing the follies of the great sophist by undertaking the defence of Simonides, who might almost be taken for a sophist born before his time. His defence, if it is considered in this light, must be judged brilliant. Protagoras certainly knows, as his reluctance shows, that he has met his match, and Hippias sets the seal of his approval upon Socrates’ exhibition, adding that he is himself prepared to enter the ring, by following on with another fine discourse on the same poem.²⁸ The Socratic irony is apparently lost on Hippias, and Socrates is publicly received into the circle of sophists. This is indeed an enchanting success, as must be obvious to the spectators, who are probably to be thought of as fascinated and entertained, if not entirely convinced.

The irony is rich and pervasive: it flicks at each of the great sophists in turn, and does not spare even the sophistic poet. The

²⁸ It is interesting, if novel, to speculate how Hippias would have interpreted the poem. No doubt, he would have founded his view on the antithesis of *φύσις* and *νόμος*, which he uses in 337D. Being would presumably be *φύσει*, and becoming *νόμῳ*; man’s circumstances would comprise his nature, whereas his moral life would be convention. There would be a distinction in nature, but none in convention, between the man of perfect *ἀπερή* and the man who achieved Simonides’ more modest ideal.

humour, which is always spirited, broadens at times almost into farce. Here the novelty of these discussions is important: it was oddly exhilarating to consider that even the most familiar words might be found, by reason and analogy, to have meanings that were not accepted by the common consent of usage. That exhilaration gave an impetus to the fancy of the sophists and to the comic imagination of Plato. It is as though in the description of this scene he were resolved to treat it not a bit more seriously than he judged, in all strictness, that it deserved; but he exploited to the full all that was false and ridiculous in it. He turned it this way and that, like a paste diamond, to catch every sham, but delightful, glitter.

Still the irony, no matter how entertaining to the reader, is a real difficulty to the interpreter. Where can one find a sure footing in this treacherous muskeg? Socrates, to be sure, sends a will-o'-the-wisp to guide us by insisting that from the beginning to the end of the poem Simonides is replying to Pittacus; but that is exposed for what it is by the dangerous, and indeed fatal, quicksands into which it led Protagoras and the rest. Nevertheless, Socrates does mark the trail once or twice by his own passing, and there his tracks help as much as his spectacular blazes mislead us. In particular, there is something that inspires confidence in the way he denies from the very beginning that Simonides contradicts himself or that *εἶναι* is a synonym of *γενέσθαι*. In this denial he defends, as we have seen, the received opinion that Protagoras has set himself to overthrow.

No doubt the distinction that Socrates makes between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι* will not do. It is contradicted by Simonides' own usage in a number of places,²⁹ and especially by his statement (10-11), made with some emphasis, that to be good (or bad), so far from being impossible, is necessary if the gods (or circumstances) will it. If Simonides is making a distinction, it cannot be between an unchanging being and an unresting becoming. To his mind man both is and becomes good.

The distinction becomes clearer if it is noticed that the verb *εἶναι* occurs only in the second and fourth stanzas; in the first and third the verb is *γενέσθαι*. Moreover *εἶναι* is associated with necessity: a man cannot help being good or bad if the gods so ordain. On the other hand, *γενέσθαι* is free, for it is said to be difficult (and not simply inevitable or impossible) to become good, and a man is

²⁹ At lines 8, 10-11 (where forms of *εἶναι* are understood), 13, and 24.

not to be blamed for certain failures, if they are not the result of his own willing act. A man cannot be other than he is, but what he becomes depends, within the limits of circumstance, on himself.

It is, of course, a common-place of Greek poetry from the time of Homer that mortal men are bound inescapably by the rule of the immortal gods. This dependence affects even the self, as we see from the words of the disguised Odysseus to one of the suitors (*Od.* 18.136-37),

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
οἶον ἐπ' ἡμαρ ἄγῃσι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

Later poets reflect that man is *ἐφήμερος*, "subject to the day," that is, subject to the circumstances of the moment.³⁰ This dependence on circumstance is then found, as by Simonides, in man's very being. But the notion of necessity is the same as in Homer. It is not the iron working of a mechanical law, which excludes all freedom automatically; instead it is dynamic, and is found in the inescapable compulsion of circumstance, whenever and however the gods may determine. Moira brings to mortal men, as Solon observed, both good and ill; but the gifts of the immortal gods, of whichever kind, cannot be refused.³¹

Simonides' conception differs, however, from Homer's in making more explicit the subjection of the blessed gods to necessity. This is to say that he recognises more clearly than Homer that the gods, like men, have a nature to which they cannot be untrue. It is the nature of man that he cannot be other than the gods make him, but it is the nature of the gods that they cannot be so determined. The necessity against which even the gods cannot fight is the necessity that they be gods.

If Simonides' notion of necessity is thus understood, it becomes possible to answer the question that he poses in this poem: is the ideal of human excellence attainable by mortal men? The ideal itself differs somewhat in form but not at all in essence from the heroic *ἀρετή* of Homer. Achilles is swift of foot, strong of body, a valiant fighter, and a skilful speaker. In all of the endowments and accomplishments which win honour, and in the spirit that fulfils them, he is the best of all the Greeks that fought before Troy. His

³⁰ Cf. H. Fränkel, "Man's 'Ephemeros' Nature According to Pindar and Others," *TAPA* 77 (1946) 131-45.

³¹ Sol. fr. 1.63-64 (Diehl³).

endowment and achievements are matched by the happiness of his social circumstances. Position, wealth, power, breeding, all are his. He might have defied Malvolio's analysis of greatness, for he was born to it, achieved it, and had it thrust upon him. His superiority is a kind of indisputable fact that one could not help but acknowledge.³² No one could doubt it, or feel the slightest embarrassment in recognising it. His manifest superiority compels as well as deserves praise. Theognis put the point succinctly,³³

ὄν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμέμενος αἰνεῖ.

Achilles' ἀπερή is meritorious because it is his own, but beyond diminution or detraction because it is the gift of the gods.³⁴ He is, in Homer's words, "the blameless Achilles"; he might have been, in another age, "a verray, parfit gentle knight" or a "*chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*."

This grandeur was the creation of the epic at a time when the Greeks were emerging from their Dark Age into the first light of their own culture, but still looked backwards into that dim but august past to the great princes and warriors who had brought them from the north by force of arms into Hellas and carried them across the sea to Anatolia. Their ideal of perfection was bequeathed, in the concept of the noble (τὸ ἐσθλόν), to the Greek aristocrats, who necessarily found it difficult to realise in the common-place life of their cities. Above all, the gods now kept more aloof. The aristocrats were not, like Achilles, the children of a goddess: at best they were separated by several generations from the nearest divine ancestor of whom they could boast. The age was tinged with pessimism that grew out of regret for the past and fear for the future.

In these circumstances, the aristocrats discovered that failure had to be accepted as a fact, and that the traditional praise of the great was mingled with censure of their short-comings. Pindar, who infuses a new and almost spiritual life into the old ideas, is able to maintain, in spite of detractors, the ideal that the noble should be free of blame and in harmony with his fellow-citizens.³⁵ Theognis,

³² For the invariable connection, in Homer, between ἀπερή and honour, cf. Jaeger, *Paideia* 1 (above, note 4) 8-9.

³³ Theogn. 169. See the interpretation of L. Radermacher, "Zu griechischen Texten," *WS* 56 (1938-1939) 1-2.

³⁴ The test of ἀπερή, Theognis reflects (1177-78), is that a man be ἐργων αἰσχρῶν ἀπαθής καὶ ἀεργός. He will be, in Simonides' word, πανάμωμος, since his circumstances admit, and his achievement deserves, no blame.

³⁵ Cf. e.g. *Nem.* 8.38.

however, who saw the overthrow by revolution of the old moral and social order in Megara, acknowledges with chagrin that poverty deprives a noble of his excellence and that civil war makes detraction inevitable.³⁶

The conditions of aristocratic society were becoming less and less stable, and the hope of achieving the aristocratic ideal became correspondingly less probable. The old notion that the highest human excellence was the prerogative of a class was dying, and with it the position of the Greek aristocracy. Nevertheless no one, at the beginning of the fifth century, concluded that ἀρετή was quite independent of circumstance. The old ideal still commanded allegiance; only the conditions of its achievement became ever more difficult.

That it is difficult to achieve excellence had, of course, long been a truism.³⁷ Hesiod, at the beginning of the seventh century, was no friend to the aristocrats, but he shared their belief in the stability of ἀρετή: once achieved, it is effortlessly enjoyed. The difficulty, to his mind, lay in the achieving of it, in the laborious life that was necessary to success on a Boeotian farm.³⁸ Later, at the beginning of the sixth century, Pittacus, who ruled Mytilene by right of an extraordinary magistracy, hearing that Periander of Corinth had converted a similar office into a tyranny, begged to be relieved of his powers, pronouncing the famous apophthegm, that it is difficult to be good. The Greeks, who had a taste for maxims and for stories concerning the sages who gave them currency, said that when Solon heard the story in Athens he observed gravely that all good things are difficult.³⁹ In this story is struck the familiar note of archaic reflection, the uncertainty of human happiness. The difficulty of life, which Hesiod saw as real but limited to achievement, is now held to be true of human worth itself. Excellence has become transient and fragile, being contingent upon both the favour of the gods and the merit of men.⁴⁰

³⁶ Cf. e.g. Theogn. 24, 173, 367-70, 649-52, 683-86, 795-96, 1117-18.

³⁷ Cf. e.g. Theogn. 336 and Phocylides fr. 13 (Diehl³). For the latter, cf. the comments of Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 174 and note 2.

³⁸ *Op.* 289-92.

³⁹ Schol. *ad* Plat. *Crat.* 384B and *Hipp. Maj.* 304E.

⁴⁰ Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 173-75 takes the saying of Pittacus and fr.13 (Diehl³) of Phocylides in a purely moral sense that is independent of birth, position, and fortune. It is, no doubt, true that Pittacus was impressed by the difficulty of doing one's duty, but it seems clear that he was equally influenced by the perils of all kinds that attach to high office. Like Solon (fr. 1.3-6 Diehl³), he must have regarded

About a hundred years later Simonides was, in appearance, making the same points, the difficulty of all human achievements, the dependence of man upon divine favour (or circumstance) in all his acts, the absolute knowledge and power of the gods, and (by implication) the absolute nothingness of men.⁴¹ Excellence is still to be won only by the man who has sweat on his brow (although it is significant that he must also have manliness in his heart).⁴² 'Αρετή has become, to be sure, grander and more remote: she is a goddess who keeps her court on a rocky crag which no one can approach without hard climbing.

This however is not all. Simonides was famous for his wisdom, which comprised, in addition to other knowledge, not a little of the shrewdness of the children of this world. If these were the conditions of life, he must have reflected, it was more profitable to accept them and to cope with them than to join in the lyric chorus of melancholy reflection. The gods were, in the end, all-powerful and men helpless against them; but the ultimate was not the only reality. There was also the practical world of human life. It was, to be sure, in origin contingent upon the divine will; nevertheless, considered in itself, it possessed its own necessity, for the facts of circumstance were necessary for men. Here was something that was, for practical purposes, certain. Whatever the gods, through circumstance, determined could not be helped and had to be accepted. Human life provided, within its limits, a concrete necessity.

The old ideal of ἀρετή, if measured by this pragmatic standard, might be impossible in any given case.⁴³ What Greek aristocrat was blessed by fortune as Achilles was? If a man were overwhelmed by some desperate disaster — war, revolution, poverty, disease, or chance — he would necessarily fall short of complete excellence.

certain conditions of circumstance as necessary — and problematical. The impression left by the story is not so much reproof of Periander as Pittacus' despair of human aspiration. The achievement of the ideal is arduous and its possession perilous.

⁴¹ Fr. 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 (Diehl).

⁴² Fr. 37 (Diehl): ἀνδρεία appears here for the first time in extant Greek literature. It has a meaning wider than the later "courage," being that by which man freely achieves, within given circumstances, an ideal state and so gains merit.

⁴³ Fränkel (above, note 6) 399 refers appropriately to Sol. fr. 15 (Diehl³). Solon reflects that no mortal man is μάκαρ, and all are πονηροί. Semon. fr. 4 (Diehl) and Theogn. 799 observe that no living man is without blame. Even in Homer men that eat the fruits of the earth (*Il.* 6.142) are distinguished from the gods who are forever nourished by ambrosia (e.g. *Od.* 5.93) by their inferior strength and their mortality. For Simonides the image (lines 16–17) has a more sombre connotation of inevitable imperfection and unhappiness.

And if his failure were necessary, it was not blameworthy: it ought not to diminish praise of his achievements in other respects. In his case and in this respect ἀρετή was neither easy nor difficult but impossible.

The distinction made by Simonides between εἶναι and γενέσθαι now becomes clear.⁴⁴ Being is whatever is determined in practical life by this concrete necessity, and becoming whatever is freely achieved by men. Man's being is comprised by his circumstances, his becoming by his achievement.⁴⁵ Only becoming, therefore, can be easy or difficult, and the famous saying of Pittacus was simply a mistake. He had, as it were, confused his categories.

This distinction differs from that made by Socrates in only one respect. Socrates conceives necessity as logical and general rather than dynamic and particular. Therefore, on his view, necessity excludes all change, for change implies contradiction and the law of contradiction permits no exceptions. It binds even the gods, who are the source of the concrete necessity of practical affairs. In this respect it is the successor of that other necessity, also recognised by Simonides, against which even the gods cannot fight. Because of it all things are eternally and immutably what they are.

Only the immortal gods, it is obvious, could possess this unchanging being; the lives of mortal men had to fall in the category of becoming. It is precisely on this point that Socrates' interpretation of the poem founders, for the concrete necessity of Simonides does not exclude change, but only change by men. A man is what he cannot help being (7-12):

ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ
ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορά καθέλῃ.

But what he is may be changed at the will of the gods:

πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς,

⁴⁴ Cf. the use of γενέσθαι of the proof a man gives of his worth when faced by the test of unfavourable circumstances. The verb is used particularly of those who show their courage in battle by fighting bravely until killed: cf. e.g. Hdt. 7.224.1: Λεωνίδης . . . πίπτει ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄριστος. Adam in his note *ad* 344B4 recognised that the usage was relevant to the interpretation of Simonides, although he did not grasp the precise distinction between γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι.

⁴⁵ A similar distinction is to be found in the notion, found in Theognis (695-96) and Pindar (*Ol.* 1.104; *Pyth.* 11.50-51) that ἀρετή consists in the love of τὰ καλὰ and the power to achieve this ideal. Cf. Xenophanes in note 76 below and Fränkel (above, note 6) 397, note 9; 604, note 11.

and (Plato continues, quoting less precisely): ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστοὶ εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

In Simonides' view, then, being is possessed by both gods and men, and in each case is necessary, although in different senses. Men cannot help their circumstances, the gods cannot cease to be gods. On the other hand, becoming has to do with the management of practical affairs; that is, with achieving what, in the given circumstances, is possible. It is therefore a category that is relevant to men only; for the gods, who are the rulers of circumstance, never have practical problems. Only men, by their labours, overcome difficulties, and the gods, who are all-wise and all-powerful, achieve their ends effortlessly.⁴⁶

If a man achieves whatever success his circumstances permit, he is said *γενέσθαι ἀγαθός*. If however he enjoys some notable advantage in his circumstances, he is said *εἶναι ἀγαθός*. For a corresponding failure or disadvantage *κακός* is used. No particular success or advantage is designated by *ἀγαθός*, and *κακός* is equally general.

With *ἐσθλός*, on the other hand, *ἀρετή* is implied and the case is different.⁴⁷ Here we have a definite pattern of humanity, created by the heroism of the epic and fostered as an ideal by the aristocrats. *Ἐσθλός* designates not only great achievement but also fixed conditions of circumstance. It is carefully explained by Simonides (1-3): to be *ἐσθλός*, he says, is to be truly good, to be perfect in the strength and skill of limbs and mind, to be fashioned without blemish.⁴⁸ This is a rationalised form of that manifest and indisputable excellence that both compels and merits praise.⁴⁹

That a man should achieve this ideal is not, abstractly considered, impossible, for the gods can make the conditions of human life

⁴⁶ Cf. Xenoph. B25 (Diels⁶): ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόον φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. The point is implied in Sim. fr. 10 (Diehl).

⁴⁷ Verdam (above, note 6) 308-9, who divines the importance of the antithesis between "fortune" and "virtue," finds it unhappily in the distinction between *ἐσθλός* and *ἀγαθός*. It is hard to imagine how he would have taken lines 10-12 and 23-24. He is more fortunate in remarking that the distinction between *γενέσθαι* and *εἶναι* is appropriate to the main antithesis, but he seems not to grasp the implications of his observation.

⁴⁸ Cf. Hom. *Il.* 15.642-43: παντοίας ἀρετάς, ἥμιν πόδας ἥδ' ἐμὰ μάχεσθαι / καὶ νόον; also Pind. *Ol.* 4.28-29; *Pyth.* 1.42, 10.23; *Isthm.* 8.41.

⁴⁹ There is conspicuously no mention of noble birth, of great position, wealth, and power, of gentle breeding, nor of divine aid. In this respect Simonides' version of the traditional ideal is less aristocratic and particular. Similarly, *ἀγαθός* is not "noble," as Bowra (above, note 6) 341 takes it, but a general term for any advantage or achievement: cf. above. Here, as in the conception of his own ideal (cf. 162 below), Simonides' outlook is bourgeois.

what they will. But in the practical sphere, which is bound by a concrete necessity, it might be found, as we saw, that no man enjoyed the requisite advantages of circumstance. It will depend, therefore, on the circumstances of the case whether it is possible for a man γενέσθαι ἐσθλός. However, should a man, by divine favour, achieve this ideal, the circumstances, which are given by the gods, would be necessary for men and compel recognition, but the achievement itself, like all things human, would be contingent and momentary. The circumstances of the ἐσθλός would compel, and his achievement merit, praise.

On the other hand, it is undoubtedly impossible that a man should εἶναι ἐσθλός, for otherwise ἀρετή would become necessary for men, a matter of circumstance only.⁵⁰ The phrase is appropriate to the gods alone. θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας. The gods are necessarily the supreme power of the world, because there is no other that can overcome them. They are necessarily unchanged in the sense that there is no contingency to which they are subject. They can without effort make of the world what they like, but they can never vacate their perfect strength and felicity.⁵¹

So much Simonides held to be true. In expounding his general view he demonstrates a very considerable skill in dialectic, and shows that his reputation for wisdom had solid grounds for its existence. By providing a workable distinction between the necessary and the contingent he made an advance that was indispensable for ethical enquiry, and so deserved the position, to which he was raised after his death, as a kind of patron of the sophistic movement.

In one important respect, however, he remains a child of the archaic age. He takes it for granted that complete and certain knowledge is the prerogative of the all-powerful gods;⁵² for the necessity by which the world is bound is simply their will. Man in consequence lacks such knowledge, although he is acquainted by his experience with the concrete determinations of the divine rule.

⁵⁰ In the anonymous verse quoted by Socrates at 344D ἐσθλός εἶναι has come to denote the enjoyment of favourable circumstances, thus taking the meaning that Simonides gave to ἀγαθός εἶναι in line 10.

⁵¹ Theognis (327-28) states succinctly the difference between men, for whom shortcomings are inevitable, and the gods, for whom they are impossible: ἀμαρτωλαὶ γὰρ ἄμ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἔπονται / θνητοῖς, Κέρνε· θεοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐθέλουσι φέρειν. The note of Carrière *a & loc.* in the Budé text seems mistaken. Simonides himself defines the divine condition in fr. 63 (Diehl): μηδὲν ἀμαρτεῖν ἐστι θεοῦ καὶ πάντα κατορθοῦν, if this is his.

⁵² Cf. fr. 10 (Diehl). Notice the connection between the power of the gods (upon which all human achievement is dependent) and their knowledge.

Simonides, however, does not on that account lapse into pessimism; instead he turns his attention, as we have seen, to the skill by which men manage their practical affairs. This is necessarily prudence or guess-work rather than certain knowledge, but it is valued by Simonides because it is useful and possible.⁵³ In all this Simonides resembles his older contemporary, Xenophanes of Colophon, who conceived that the world was ruled by an all-powerful and all-knowing God and that, as human experience gave no clear knowledge of the world or its rule, men might indeed entertain correct opinions of it, but only from a shrewd judgment of appearances.⁵⁴

For these reasons a man cannot know for certain what are the possibilities of human achievement in general, and of the achievement of *ἀρετή* in particular.⁵⁵ One can only say that the widest opportunities are given to those whom the gods love.⁵⁶ But if a poet unknowingly sets his sights too high, experience will prove his hopes vain. Such must be the meaning of the difficult lines at the beginning of the third stanza (13–18).

τούνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
 δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ-
 πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι
 καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
 ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγέλλω.

Expectation in archaic poetry is often illusory and even fatally

⁵³ Protagoras denied this distinction between appearance and reality, making "man the measure." In consequence, circumstance in itself cannot, as in Simonides, exhibit a divine necessity. The concrete and practical world of Simonides is cut loose from its anchor in heaven, and the world is what man makes of it. Simonides' distinction between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*, if considered in this light, simply disappears. Hence Plato is faithful to the historical facts in representing Protagoras as failing to recognise it in Simonides' poem. (The variation between *ἐσθλός* and *ἀγαθός* would not help him, for no doubt the one word appeared to him simply an old-fashioned synonym for the other.) On similar grounds Protagoras might have defended his diversion of the discussion from Socrates' *a priori* enquiry into the relation of the whole to the parts of virtue. He might have argued that progress could only be made by the examination of representative opinions, such as those of the poets.

⁵⁴ For the divine rule, cf. Xenoph. B23–26 (Diels⁶). The judgment of appearances is *δόκος* (B34.5), and is like, but not identical with, truth (B35). Simonides also had faced the problem, to judge by fr. 55 (Diehl): *τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται*.

⁵⁵ Theognis remarks (659) that one cannot swear that a thing will never be.

⁵⁶ The practical world is made up of more and less, and Simonides' phrase *ἐπὶ πλείστον* later becomes common in authors, like Thucydides, whose thought is confined to that world.

misleading.⁵⁷ The characteristic expedient of Greek prudence is to advise keeping ἐλπίς tightly reined in order to prevent it from plunging over the brink of the precipice which, though unseen, is certainly ahead. So here Simonides abjures the impracticable hopes that aim at the impossible; of such a kind, he guesses astutely, is the ideal of the man of blameless ἀπερή, who is perfect, by his circumstances and achievement, in body and in mind. This is his best opinion; but it is only opinion, and not certain knowledge,⁵⁸ so that he adds the saving — and possibly cynical — clause, that if he comes upon such a one, he will proclaim his discovery.⁵⁹

Simonides gives his judgment here with confidence, for he speaks with the authority of the poet, who has the power to allot praise and blame.⁶⁰ The ground of the poet's authority is, by tradition, his wisdom (σοφία); but this is no longer, as in Homer and Hesiod, simply the inspiration of the Muses, although the poet cannot, any more than anyone else, dispense with divine favour:⁶¹ it is both knowledge founded on dialectical skill and opinion founded on common sense.

His purpose in this poem, apart from the criticism of the form of Pittacus' maxim, is to affirm the sufficiency of a more modest and a more practicable ideal than the perfect ἀπερή of tradition. The

⁵⁷ Cf. the examples collected in F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London 1907) 167–68.

⁵⁸ Therefore in lines 13–15 Simonides means that he will not waste his time on what he judges, in the light of his practical experience, to be impossible. But he acknowledges that his judgment is not certain, and so there is no contradiction of his statement, made at the beginning of the poem, that it is difficult to become good. Indeed this statement, in this context, is equivalent to what he says in lines 13–15. From Simonides' point of view the difficult shades imperceptibly into the practically impossible. It is the same with Thucydides, whose translators are often tempted to turn χαλεπὸν by "impossible": cf. e.g. 1.22.1 and Steup's note *ad loc.*

⁵⁹ The translation of this line has caused difficulties. Wilamowitz (above, note 5) 161 gives: "Erst ihn finden, dann will ich ihn euch zeigen." Fränkel (above, note 6) 399: "ich will euch nicht verkündigen dass ich solches gefunden hätte." But the text is twice vouched for by Plato (345D and 346D), and ἔπειτα evidently means "hereafter," as sometimes when combined with the future tense: cf. e.g. *Il.* 15.140. There is therefore no need to alter the text to ἐπὶ τ' (or θ') after Bergk, as is often done; our knowledge of the metrical form of the poem is too uncertain to be decisive. See also the remarks of Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 164, note 2.

⁶⁰ The use of the first person seven times in twenty-nine lines is significant, and the four first-personal pronouns are emphatic: cf. 148 above. However, Simonides stresses his opinion in this way not because it is his own, but because he judges it to be true. To be sure, he is pleased about his superiority to the great majority: cf. 148, note 26 above; but in this he is as much (or as little) individualistic as Heraclitus in similar passages of self-advertisement.

⁶¹ Cf. fr. 10.1–2 (Diehl).

ideal is to be brought within the range of possibility as estimated by human experience, and not by the complete and sure knowledge of the gods. In consequence, his tone is strongly negative:⁶² he desires to absolve from blame all who, because of unhappy circumstances, necessarily fall short, in certain respects, of the old ideal.

To be sure, he is not careful to qualify his meaning in this way. He says simply (19–21):

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν. ἀνάγ-
κα δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

This has been taken to mean that Simonides is re-interpreting ἀρετή as a purely moral ideal,⁶³ and it is certain that in the second of these lines we have for the first time in the poem a purely moral concept.⁶⁴ However the negative form of his principle, both here and in the last lines of the poem, ought to give pause to anyone who maintains this view; for it would be a queer, if not absolutely unexampled,

⁶² Notice the repeated use of negatives. Simonides harps upon the inevitability of imperfection, the impossibility of the old ideal, the abjuring of blame, the sufficiency of abstention from wilful dishonour, the ineluctability of necessity. Moreover, he was notoriously mercenary and, as Socrates suggests (346B), doubtless found himself more than once commissioned to praise an unlikely subject. Hence if the poem was intended as praise of Scopas, it would be impossible to mistake a note of apology in it. However, it is difficult to believe that the poet, who found mules a possible, if uncongenial, subject for an epinician (fr. 19 Diehl), could not have found more to praise in even the most unpromising tyrant. It seems better to suppose that Scopas had sufficient culture to enjoy — or to tolerate — a theoretical enquiry into the possibility of ἀρετή, whatever his own moral practices may have been. This is the view of Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 169, who points to the story told by Cicero (*De nat. deor.* 1.60) that Hiero enquired of Simonides concerning the nature of God, and to the discussion of the value of tyranny by Simonides and Hiero in Xenophon's *Hiero*. The poem to Scopas may, then, be the poet's answer to the tyrant's question whether ἀρετή was possible. Sheppard (above, note 6) xxx-xxxii suggests that the poem is a warning against self-righteousness. But self-righteousness is not necessarily an offence to Greek ethics, as Homer's Achilles and Aristotle's μεγαλόψυχος indicate; and Simonides' objection to ἀρετή is that it is practically impossible. And whatever Simonides may have thought about self-righteousness, Scopas, I conceive, felt secure against that charge.

⁶³ As by Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 175–76. Bowra's view (above, note 6) 345–51 is not altogether clear, but he appears to follow Wilamowitz.

⁶⁴ The criterion of willingness in the judging of actions became familiar, very likely, in contemporary law. At any rate, it occurs in an Athenian inscription (*IG* I².115) that gives what purports to be a revised form, made at the end of the fifth century, of the "law of Draco" concerning homicide of two hundred years earlier: cf. M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* 1² (Oxford 1946) 214. This criterion gives to αἰσχρός the ethical sense of (we should say) merited dishonour: cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 178. Morality remains, of course, as public as before: hence the good is what merits praise and honour, and the bad the opposite.

moral ideal that consisted exclusively of acts of omission.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Simonides goes on to say (22–28):

. . . οὐκ εἰμι φιλόμωμος . . .
 . . . ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ, δὲ ἂν μὴ
 κακὸς ᾗ⁶⁶ . . . μὴδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος εἰ-
 δὼς γ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν,
 ὕγι᾽ ἀνὴρ . . . οὐ μιν ἐγὼ
 μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἡλιθίων
 ἀπείρων γενέθλα.

By his own definition a man is what the gods, through circumstances, make him: hence the terms used here with εἶναι cannot be moral. The man who will satisfy Simonides can be neither unsuccessful⁶⁷ nor too ineffective.⁶⁸ He must not be utterly overwhelmed by desperate disasters, although everyone whom we know fails necessarily in some things.

In what respect then may one fall short of perfect ἄρετή and yet escape blame? Clearly, if one avoids doing what is thought, in a certain context, to be dishonourable. Simonides indicates what the context is when he prescribes that the praiseworthy man must be able at least⁶⁹ to observe ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν.⁷⁰ The epithet defines the

⁶⁵ The reason for the negative form has been made clear above (160). In origin the concept is obviously legal; for the law makes no distinctions among the "not guilty." Simonides doubtless made no clear distinction between legal right and justice, and in consequence the legal form serves as a means to a moral judgment.

⁶⁶ Fränkel (above, note 6) 401, note 17 proposes to fill the gap in line 24 with νόον. He points to the interesting parallel in Solon fr. 19.11–12 (Diehl³), where Solon connects an ordered νόος with abstention from ἀπάλαμνα ἔργα. This antithesis of understanding and action would be acceptable here, where it has the advantage of providing a kind of counterpart to line 2. In this way the notion of the mean and the extremes, which is certainly present, would be made more explicit: cf. 163 below.

⁶⁷ Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 175, note 2 thought that κακὸς was Plato's paraphrase, and not Simonides' own word. His difficulty is removed, however, if the word is not given a moral sense. Cf. 156 above.

⁶⁸ The meaning of ἀπάλαμνος varies: cf. *LSJ* and Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 175, note 3. It may mean "helpless" (as here, where it recalls the ἀμήχανος of line 9 and the βρότεοι παλάμαι of fr. 48.6 Diehl³); or "wrongful" (of both men and actions, in moral or social contexts). Wilamowitz takes it in the moral sense. But this can hardly be right: first, for the reason given in the text; secondly, because of the use of ἄγαν, which is inappropriate to wickedness, but serves very well to mark off an extreme of circumstance: cf. 163 below on the mean. Simonides' requirements would be modest indeed if he were satisfied to praise a man for refraining from exceeding — or excessive — wickedness.

⁶⁹ The restrictive γ', which the Platonic mss give, should be retained, as Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 175, note 4 remarked. Simonides is indicating the indispensable characteristic of the good citizen.

⁷⁰ This is an emendation (first made by G. Hermann) for the γ' ὀνήσει πόλιν of the

essence, and not an accident: *δίκη* is the right order of the city, and upon its observance the whole welfare of the city depends. Solon had long before proclaimed the duty that is imposed upon all citizens when he made a law, it is said, enjoining everyone to take sides in case of civil strife;⁷¹ and later Pericles was to boast in the Funeral Oration that the Athenians regarded the man who did not take part in political life not as quiet, but as useless.⁷² The obligation to perform the duties of a citizen lies upon everyone, and failure to perform them is not only disastrous to the city but dishonourable and blameworthy in the defaulter. The city's life encompasses the whole duty of man, and the good citizen is the good man. Simonides himself has said elsewhere, *πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει*.⁷³ For him, the praiseworthy man must perform his duties as a citizen; if in other respects he is prevented by circumstance from achieving perfect *ἀρετή*, he merits no censure.

We see now that Simonides' ideal is more bourgeois than chivalrous:⁷⁴ the citizen who wins success in the life of the city and is faithful in the performance of his duties. This is, no doubt, the *ὑγιής ἀνὴρ*,⁷⁵ the sound and serviceable member of the body politic. He differs vastly from Achilles, but as in his case, his circumstances compel and his achievements merit praise. Simonides' ideal is

mss, but it appears certain. As a formal analogy to the phrase, Smyth (above, note 6) 316 compares Soph. *Ant.* 369: *θεῶν τ' ἐνορκον δίκαν*. The use of *εἰδώς* in this way is familiar from Homer: cf. *Od.* 20.287: *ἀνὴρ ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς* and the discussion in R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1951) 15–16. The construction is not unknown later: cf. e.g. Bacch. 10.41 (Blass-Suess-Snell) and Soph. *Ant.* 301.

⁷¹ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.5 and Plut. *Sol.* 20.1. Solon himself states that, when everyone observes *δίκη*, the city is benefited by the blessings of *εὐνομία*: cf. fr. 3.7, 14, 32–39 (Diehl³).

⁷² Thuc. 2.40.2.

⁷³ Fr. 53 (Diehl).

⁷⁴ It is true that the vogue of his poem at Athens may very well have prepared the way for the advance of democracy. Nevertheless, his idea is not necessarily democratic, since his good citizens need not be in the majority.

⁷⁵ Early instances of the transference of the idea of health from the medical to other spheres are few: cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 6) 177, note 1. In Hom. *Il.* 8.524, which is suspected on other grounds of being late, *ὑγιής* seems to mean "fitting": cf. Leaf's note *ad loc.* In Aesch. *Eum.* 535 we have *ἐκ δ' ὑγιείας φρενῶν*. The common use of the idea comes later. Cf., however, Hdt. 6.109.5, where Miltiades, thinking of *στάσις* and Medism, fears that something *σάθρὸν* may befall the Athenians. Here, as in Simonides, the criterion of health is the welfare of the state. Wilamowitz 177 also points to the similar use of *νόσος* and *νοσεῖν*; cf. also Bowra in *CP* 29 (1934) 238. In any case, the idea is necessarily empirical and pragmatic, and serves as an appropriate symbol of Simonides' ideal in contrast to the severe and other-worldly connotations of the Pythagorean *τετράγωνος* (cf. note 8, above).

still highly concrete, and he has not risen to the abstraction of man as a moral being.⁷⁶

In excellence Simonides' man is inferior to the man of perfect *ἀρετή*, but superior to those who are *ἀπάλαμνοι*: in this respect Socrates was justified in finding a mean in the poem.⁷⁷ In merit, however, the case is different, for there can be no distinction, on this point, between the new and the old ideal. The divine hero and the sound citizen merit honour alike, since the former has no failures, and the latter only such as are not culpable.⁷⁸

πάντα τοι καλὰ . . .
τοῖσιν αἰσχροῖα μὴ μέμικται (28–29).

Achilles towers above the honest citizen in *ἀρετή*, but not in deserts; he compels, but does not merit, higher praise; he is beyond all blame, but the citizen deserves none; he is a greater, but not a better, man. In this comparison, but only here, Simonides makes a purely moral judgment.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Xenophanes (B1.15–16 Diels⁶) would have people pray *τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι πρήσσειν*: that one may be granted the circumstances necessary for the performance of the acts that *δίκη* requires. Here, as in Simonides, the *δίκαιος ἀνὴρ* must enjoy certain favourable circumstances; he is not simply the abstraction of man as a moral being.

⁷⁷ For the advantages of the mean in the life of the city, cf. the fragments of Solon and Theognis 335–36; Phocyl. fr. 12 (Diehl³) has *μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι*.

⁷⁸ Fränkel (above, note 6) 402–3 has some interesting remarks about the thought of the poem. He argues that Simonides uses, like Parmenides, the strict logic of polar thought: all that is not *αἰσχρόν* is *καλόν*. These are the two absolute entities, and human beings are relative, being compounded of the two principles in varying proportions. However Simonides does not pretend to the Eleatic absolute knowledge of absolute being, only to a practical judgment of affairs. In consequence, *ἀρετή* is not absolutely, but only practically, unattainable. Xenophanes provides a better analogy, for he allows that human opinion about the world may sometimes be correct, although never grounded on certain knowledge; cf. 157–58 above. It is true that Simonides distinguishes between the absolute and the relative in the second stanza. However, this distinction applies to circumstances only: men's circumstances are always more or less good, and might be good enough to permit the achievement of *ἀρετή*; but the gods are not restricted by circumstances at all. The distinction between *αἰσχρόν* and *καλόν* is not absolute, but confined to the practical sphere of achievement, as line 20 shows. The negative form of lines 19–20 and 28–29 is legal, not Eleatic: cf. note 65 above.

⁷⁹ I am not unaware that Achilles would have had his difficulties in performing the duties of a citizen. However, it is convenient to use him as the type of perfect *ἀρετή*, even in the simplified form in which Simonides presents it: cf. note 49.